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ventures such as hotels, real estate business, tourism resorts and casinos, and held by
through CLOB reportedly totaled about 144 billion shares valued at S$229 billion
(US$134.70 billion) since it started trading on January 2,1999 (Toh, 1999).
According to the Stock Exchange of Singapore journal, CLOB shares as of September
15, 1998, were valued at RM$29.2 billion or US$7.68 billion with an account of 172,419
CLOB investors. The KLSE announced on December 31, 1998, that Singapore's Central
Depository (CDP) will be recognized as an authorized nominee for CLOB shares until
the end of 1999. The Malaysian government claimed that the trading of CLOB shares was
used for speculative attacks on the Malaysian stock exchange and if such trading would
have continued it could have triggered a massive sell down in Malaysian shares. The
tying of the Malaysian shares held by Singaporean investors and to make it a matter of
government-to-government issue would boost the stability of the stock markets of both
Malaysia and Singapore. However, restricting the shareholders that held stocks in the
the KLSE the whole of year 1999 thus dampened tourism development in Malaysia.

Implications for the Tourism Sector
While other factors have been at work, such as political uncertainty, environmental
pollution, health risks and competitive pressures, there is a strong link between economic
movements and the state of the tourism sector. Before the implementation of the capital
controls in September 1998, the industry was already experiencing a serious decline in
growth rates compared to earlier years of the decade. In 1994, tourism made up 4.6% of
( ~ ~ $ 3 . billion)
56
compared with RM$4.5 billion-(~~$1'78
billion) in 1990. creating some
120.000 new jobs created so that tourism became the second largest foreign exchange

trols represent an added complication. Malaysia's 1999 budget allocates ~ ~ $ 1 million
7 0
with 6.8 million in 1998. The tourists spent RM$2.5 billion (US$667 million) shovvine in
79
or 31.8% of the
Hotel sector in Malaysia contributed RM$2.96 billion ( ~ ~ $ 7 million)
RM$9.34 (US$2.45 billion) earnings from the tourism industry. Although there was a
167.9% increase in tourist arrivals from Singapore, China (137.2% ), the Netherlands
(108.8%),Germany (91.6%),UK (91.1%)and Japan (73.4%)for 1998, that is no guarantee
that tourists will come back automatically and already there is some evidence of the new
restrictions affecting visitors.
The rules require travelers to declare the amount of money in their possession
when entering or leaving Malaysia. Under the ruling introduced, all travelers including
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Malaysians have to obtain clearance for specific amounts noted above from state customs
officers. The Tourism Authority of Thailand claims Malaysian visitor arrivals have
dropped 70% due to these rulings. At the Singapore-Malaysian Causeway, the travelers
complain that customs officials enforcing the currency exchange regulations exacerbate
existing congestion of foot passengers and traffic.
Withn the context of tourism, there are two main objectives of imposing capital controls and currency exchange regulations. Malaysia is mired in its first recession in over a
decade and is under pressure to fend off the exodus of capital by maintaining a stable
exchange rate to insure against speculative hedgng of funds. By lowering the interest
sector. The measures, if strictly carAed out, could have a short-term, positive impact on
tourism. Lowering the interest rate will allow tourism investors to borrow cheaply for
their projects. Government officials hope that the ii~centiveswill reiuvenate manv poten-

8

1

The controls also provide the government with a chance to implement structural reforms
in the tourism sector. However. the lone-term effects of cavital controls on tourism
remain a matter of some debate with a series of causes for concern.
limit the amount of ringgits that investors can bring in and take out and if they require
earning from stocks and shares to be kept in Malaysia for a year. CLOB, the Singapore
market for Malaysian shares, was effectively killed when Malaysia introduced capital
tember 15, 1998, were valued at RM$29.2 billion ( ~ ~ $ 7 . 6billion).
8
Malaysia had claimed
that CLOB was being used for speculative attacks against its stock market, but the effects
of it on tourism related investment have not been determined as yet.
Also, the ultimatum to make RM$25 billion (US$6.57) in offshore ringgit valueless
unless repatriated into Malaysia by September 30, 1998, is tantamount to blocking fortight capital controls desirned to stem the outflow of funds will prevent existing foreim
establishments and investments from taking cash out of the country.
If the FDI for tourism projects declines, raising funds overseas will become difficult
which will create the danger of the government being forced to print local money to finance the projects. Printing a moderate amount of local money is acceptable so long as it
does not pose the risk of causing inflation, but it could actually encourage this because
tourism related projects are often extensive in scale and require substantial amounts of
capital expenditure. Another danger of creating excess money is that it may flow into real
estate and the stock market, causing the prices of properties and shares to go up artificially. The bubble in unproductive sectors may thus start building up all over again.
The FDI total into Malavsia for 1996 and 1997 was US$4.7 billion and US$3.8 billion
related and without foreign direct investment, business will contract and unemployment
in the tourism sector will rise. Unemployment can have an impact on the real estate
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destinations. Table 1provides details of hotel guest nights by orign in 1997 compared to
1996 and provides an indication of recent arrival patterns.

6!

Table 1
Malaysia: Hotel Guest Nights by Origin of Guests [1996 versus 19971
Country

Singapore
Japan
Taiwan
UK
Australia
Hong Kong
USA
China
Germany
Indonesia
Others

1996

1997

2,354,600
1,736,300
978,500
936,700
772,900
640,100
501,400
486,600
472,700
373,200
3,209,900

2,663,500
2,003,900
1,103,700
1,103,100
837,600
713,400
567,000
713,400
513,300
511,900
3,947,000

Source: Annual Report on Tourism 1997, Malaysian Tourism Board Kuala Lumpur
i

The present currency transfer approval system may cause a domino effect on neighboring countries. Malaysia is Singapore's first tourism destination and second largest
trading partner. Singavore is also Malavsia's top tourism and real estate investment destinatiGwith more rhin $10 billion invisted thire. About 50 milllion people pass through
Malaysia's entry and exit points every year. Restricting money that can be carried out t o
no more than RM$1,000 (US$263)in ringget or RM$10,000 (US$2,632)in foreign currency
per person can breed smuggling
and racketeering as reported in The Straits Times (1998).
u
When capital controls are imposeci,parallel or hack karkets in foreign exchange are
likely to -develop. Among the more common factors in the development of an underground is the under-invoicing of exports and over-invoicing of imports.
A
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Capital controls do represent a temporary measure to stop the flight of capital. The
long- term implications for the tourism sector, however, are still unclear. In the means to
i ~
implement anIeconomic policy that does n ot give an opportunity to
time, ~ a l a ~has
speculators to respond -to perceived weaknesses in the econo&c system. The large
amount of capital flight out of the country is often the symptom, and not the cause of
speculation (Tavlor, 1997). Malavsia can correct the cause of currencv speculation as well
a's put its tourism business backJon track by removing the perceiived inconsistencies in its
economic policies.
J

.
I
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Recommendations
Malavsia can minimize these potential problems bv, firstlv, being careful not to reflate its economy too rapidly, espelcially since offshore ringgit 'depogts in the order of
J

I

I

J

'

J
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Obviously Malaysia should look beyond its borders and seek regional partners in its
attempt to control the exodus of capital. In view of the different developmental stages
of the countries in its neighborhood, there is room for both vertical and horizontal linkages and integration, which will increase the policy's effectiveness, although certain
political barriers do exist to effective regional cooperation and coordination.

Conclusion
The Malaysian government wants to jump-start its economy by imposing capital
controls to insulate the currency from speculation. As has been seen, capital controls can
offer a temporary window of opportunity to stimulate and reform an economy. The government has also sharply lowered interest rates, reduced bank reserve requirements, and
instructed banks to maintain their lending growth at 8 percent. It declared two main
objectives of capital controls: to maintain a stable exchange rate and to enable the government to pursue an easier interest rate policy in a bid to stimulate the ailing economy.
However, these objectives cannot be achieved unless the economic inconsistencies
are addressed. Capital controls are not a substitute for prudent macroeconomics policy.
They do give a respite for banking reform and corporate restructuring without volatile
exchange rates forcing the central bank to raise interest rates and slow down the economy. There is, however, a danger that excessive expansion in domestic demand could
lead to the deterioration of the trade balance, resulting in a loss of foreign reserves and
capital flight. Malaysia should not allow its public and private companies to borrow
extensively all over again. Supporting non-performing loans such as that for the Multimedia-Super-corridor, a prestige tourism and IT project, on the part of domestic banks
will create the same problems that its neighbors face: asset bubbles, and over-investment
in ambitious and unproductive projects.
Other questions include whether Malaysia can afford to maintain its capital controls
even if there is no global consensus to check the excesses of currency speculation and is it
possible for the country to cut itself off indefinitely from global markets. More importantly, what are the implications and consequences on economic sectors such as tourism
if the capital controls are prolonged?
In terms of tourism, capital controls may discourage investors and tourists alike and
frustrate the achievement of targets set in the 1999 Budget based on the projected increase
in hospitality and tourism earnings. The authorities might be described as creating obstructions on the road to recovery, rather than lifting them. Tourism thus appears to have
become the victim of both the financial crisis and strategies adopted in response to it. It
will be interesting to monitor developments in Malaysia and the performance of the tourism industry as it continues to struggle to come to terms with the crisis and its aftermath.
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